American discussions of law often suffer from a fundamental ambiguity. At times the word &dquo;law&dquo; refers simply to the complex of rules, procedures, decisions, and activities which are the professional concern of lawyers; and at times, often in the same discussion, it conveys the normative expectations of liberal legalism.1 Thus, the speaker will contend that it is obligatory to obey &dquo;the law&dquo; because this is &dquo;a government of laws and not of men.&dquo; It is proposed to amplify through a case study the following contentions: 1. Legal authority in America has been increasingly delegated to agencies which do not proceed ill a legalist manner and which are riot under effective legalist constraints.
2. According to Neumann, liberal legalism contains three elements: "... [T] he law must be general in its formulation, its generality must be specific, and it must be retroactive." Neumann, op. cit., p. 23. Other qualities follow from these: " [L] iberalism regards as the rule of law exclusively the rule of statute law.... [T] he legal system of liberalism, therefore, was regarded as a closed system without gaps; [T] he judge, moreover, must be independent and litigations must be decided without regard for the desires of government. Hence there must be a separation of powers ...." Neumann, op. cit., pp. 32, 37, 40. 3. There are promising signs that the current "radical" re-examination of American pragmatism will address itself in a systematic way to Realist and other forms of sociological jurisprudence. See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York, 1969) , Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York, 1970 
